

# Aggregators in software supply chain

2023 03 08 KTH

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<https://github.com/Nordix/bomres>


<https://kth-se.zoom.us/j/64902093977>

# Agenda

- Problem
  - Security
  - Emerging regulations
    - EU Cybersecurity Resilience Act
- Bom Resolver
  - Build framework versus "Aggregators"
  - Backtrack the Alpine ECO system
- Demo
  - Online binary component in SBOM
  - Complete SBOM with product source and tools required
  - Rebuild binary component

Problem

Keep cost down -> Introduce Open Source -> Supply chain attacks



Foss in the supply chain is a reality.

[How open-source software took over the world | TechCrunch](#)



Foss may contain bugs, some impacts security

[Initial Access, Tactic TA0001 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®](#)

# Nginx and Vattenfall under attack

## Open Source Software | RISE

Open Source Software (OSS) constitutes a critical building block of our common digital infrastructure. About **90 %** of today's software contains OSS. The amount of code in companies' codebases made up of OSS has **increased** from 36 % in 2015 to **75 % in 2020**.



Problem att komma in på Kivra.

Our services aren't available right now  
We're working to restore all services as soon as possible. Please check back soon.

Problem att komma in på vattenfall.se.

## 502 Bad Gateway


nginx



Vattenfall uses nginx  
Bad gateway indicates  
reverse proxy setup.  
Let's check for  
vulnerabilities

# Nginx Vulnerabilities

[1 - Top 5 Most Critical NGINX Vulnerabilities Found - Astra Security Blog \(getastra.com\)](#)  
[Updating NGINX for Vulnerabilities in the MP4 and HLS Video-Streaming Modules - NGINX](#)  
[NginRAT parasite targets Nginx – Sansec](#)



Many security issues related to plugins loaded during runtime ( `dlopen` )  
Recompile to include module functionality in static binary

# Attack by patching NGINX

```
source="https://nginx.org/download/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
```

```
...
```


```
nginx-dav-ext-module~pr-56.patch::https://github.com/arut/nginx-dav-ext-module/pull/56.patch
```

```
...
```

Roman Arutyunyan is a member of the core development team at NGINX.

Source code patches are not listed in  
[File, Data Source DS0022](#) | [MITRE ATT&CK®](#)

"Trust but verify"



# Mitre ATT&CK

In February 2019, NGINX finally dethroned Apache HTTPD and became the most widely deployed server on the internet. According to the [Netcraft December 2019 Web Server Survey](#), NGINX has market share of 38%.

"Russian police have raided today the Moscow offices of NGINX, Inc., a subsidiary of F5 Networks and the company behind the internet's most popular web server technology. Equipment was seized and employees were detained for questioning."

RE: Regarding ATT&CK request 10909



Hans Thorsen Lamm <hans@lammda.se>

2023-01-28 16:27

To: ATTACK

Hi Jamie,

On a high level patches are covered in T1195/001. But there are two kind of patches

- Binary patches
- Source code patches

Nginx is a very popular internet facing component originating from Russia. I have analysed the Alpine build framework and it starts by unpacking the primary source and then apply patches from private GitHub accounts.

<https://git.alpinelinux.org/aports/main/nginx/APKBUILD>

In the source section all external dependencies are listed, and you see several patches from two private github accounts.

source="https://nginx.org/download/\$pkgname-\$pkgver.tar.gz

nginx-dav-ext-module~pr-56.patch::https://github.com/arut/nginx-dav-ext-module/pull/56.patch  
nginx-dav-ext-module~pr-62.patch::https://github.com/arut/nginx-dav-ext-module/commit/bbf93f75ca58657fb0f8376b0898f854f13cef91.patch

nginx-module-vts~01-938c19d.patch::https://github.com/vozlt/nginx-module-vts/commit/938c19d2e49d5f3355df5375725982d15f1270c4.patch  
nginx-module-vts~02-ad40022.patch::https://github.com/vozlt/nginx-module-vts/commit/ad4002262c19e81390f518a14f99bb594862c575.patch  
nginx-module-vts~03-c08781c.patch::https://github.com/vozlt/nginx-module-vts/commit/c08781c5095d9e6090c47176bdea322ce983ecb6.patch  
nginx-module-vts~04-1a01a87.patch::https://github.com/vozlt/nginx-module-vts/commit/1a01a87e66c9f111fb399cf40def33ab193ae393.patch  
nginx-module-vts~05-ead62a0.patch::https://github.com/vozlt/nginx-module-vts/commit/ead62a0caf405731c88ac138c4c0a82bb316cc18.patch

The Data Source DS0022 is more detailed than T1195/001, but I am not sure if source code patches are included.

Maybe it is enough to just add source code patches as a data source in DS0022 and keep the T1195/001 as is.

I wish you a great weekend too.

// Hans

[Russian police raid NGINX Moscow office | ZDNET](#)



# In addition to security we have emerging legal obligations



Manufacturer's obligations under the EU Cyber Resilience Act. (Image: European Commission)

Released	Security Support
3 months and 2 weeks ago (22 Nov 2022)	Ends in 1 year and 8 months (22 Nov 2024)
9 months ago (23 May 2022)	Ends in 1 year and 2 months (23 May 2024)
1 year and 3 months ago (24 Nov 2021)	Ends in 7 months and 4 weeks (01 Nov 2023)
1 year and 8 months ago (15 Jun 2021)	Ends in 1 month and 3 weeks (01 May 2023)
2 years ago (14 Jan 2021)	Ended 4 months ago (01 Nov 2022)
2 years and 9 months ago (29 May 2020)	Ended 10 months ago (01 May 2022)
3 years ago (19 Dec 2019)	Ended 1 year and 4 months ago (01 Nov 2021)
3 years and 8 months ago (19 Jun 2019)	Ended 1 year and 10 months ago (01 May 2021)
4 years ago (29 Jan 2019)	Ended 2 years ago (01 Jan 2021)
4 years and 8 months ago (26 Jun 2018)	Ended 2 years and 10 months ago (01 May 2020)
5 years ago (30 Nov 2017)	Ended 3 years and 4 months ago (01 Nov 2019)

# Software Bill Of Material



Ac

MAY 12, 2021

## Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity

**Sec 4 – Enhancing Software Supply Chain Security** – mandates that the government take action to protect software – with a focus on “critical software” – against cyber-attacks.

• Within 30 days of the Order, the government will solicit input from various sources, including the private sector, regarding standards, procedures, and criteria for software security (including for a Software Bill of Materials (“SBOM”)).

## [Funding to secure 10000 Open source projects](#)

The Linux Foundation and OpenSSF project, with backing from Microsoft and Google, aims to improve security of **10,000** open-source projects




[My question discussed starting ~ 40 minutes into recording](#)


[Steve Springett](#)

# Bom Resolver


- Bridge the gap between
  - Foss culture ( Cool stuff )
  - Compliance culture ( Boring stuff )
- Always source code, no exemption
- Rebuild in isolation -> Correctness of SBOM
- No binaries whatsoever
- 2018 Automate **builder** of microservice based on Alpine
- 2021 Added **resolver** as part of Internal Integrity program
- 2022 Released as Open source , presented on [FOSDEM](#)
- 2023 Received first funding 50.000 SEK from [Sidiotech](#)

# BomResolver





# Bom Resolver Flow



## Home - Lighttpd - fly light

Alpine as a aggregator of lighttpd includes many features

Buildroot is based on rules that excludes features not needed in production.

Note: for real project the dependencies of tools for building adds requirements on the tools.

<https://git.alpinelinux.org/aports>

```
makedepends="
    automake
    autoconf


build() {
    ./configure \
        --with-ldap \
        --with-openssl \
        --with-zstd \
        --with-brotli \
        --with-lua
    make
```

<https://github.com/buildroot/buildroot.git>

```
ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_LIGHTTPD_LDAP),y)
    LIGHTTPD_DEPENDENCIES += openssl
    LIGHTTPD_CONF_OPTS += -Dwith_ldap=true
else
    LIGHTTPD_CONF_OPTS += -Dwith_ldap=false
endif
```

Build container required to build product is  
generated from product sbom

Product



Tool

# Autogenerated SBOM

alpine-base  
util-linux  
alpine-sdk  
build-base  
abuild

# Additional tools needed for specific  
packages during build

# busybox  
linux-headers  
# lighttpd  
**automake**  
# lighttpd  
**autoconf**

# Additional packages needed for  
building the product

**openssl**  
**brotili**  
**openldap**  
**lua5.4**  
**zstd**

<https://bomresolver.io>



# Combines Build System with Binary distribution

Short feedback loops  
Enables us to define the  
**right product**

When the product is  
defined, we **build it right**  
( In compliance with NIS2, DORA, etc )

	Pros	Cons
Building everything manually	Full flexibility Learning experience	Dependency hell Need to understand a lot of details Version compatibility Lack of reproducibility
Binary distribution Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, etc.	Easy to create and extend	Hard to customize Hard to optimize (boot time, size) Hard to rebuild the full system from source Large system Uses native compilation (slow) No well-defined mechanism to generate an image Lots of mandatory dependencies Not available for all architectures
Build systems Buildroot, Yocto, PTXdist, etc.	Nearly full flexibility Built from source: customization and optimization are easy Fully reproducible Uses cross-compilation Have embedded specific packages not necessarily in desktop distros Make more features optional	Not as easy as a binary distribution Build time

Demo

# Demo Resolver (Service )

**Compliance Service** 1.0.1 OAS3  
[/cra/v1/openapi.json](#)  
This service is a frontend to the Alpine BOM Resolver

- <https://bomresolver.io>

  
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[Contact Hans Thorsen Lamm](#)

Servers

/cra/v1

Authorize

**Artifacts** Artifacts

GET

/artifacts

list all artifacts

✓

🔒

POST

/artifacts

Create new artifact.

✓

🔒

DELETE

/artifacts/{artifact\_id}

Remove specified artifact

✓

🔒

GET

/artifacts/{artifact\_id}

get artifact data

✓

🔒

PATCH

/artifacts/{artifact\_id}

Modify artifact.

✓

🔒

**Authentication** Token endpoint

POST

/token

JSON Web Token (JWT)

✓

**Monitoring** Service Metrics

GET

/liveness

Indicates if services is alive

✓

GET

/readiness

Indicates if services is ready to serve requests

✓

<https://bomresolver.com>

# Demo steps

S1: Create an access token

S2: Post a "one-line" Desired SBOM

S3: Depth / Effectiveness ( CISA , slide 22 )

S4: Get aggregated.json ( All metadata from "binary build )

S5: Get resolved.json ( contain ALL source needed for rebuild )


S8: Get standard lighttpd , check -V for module support ) , ls /etc/apk/keys

S11: Patch APKBUILD for lighttpd , Applied for 1 , returns 2 ( new artifact )

S12: Download custom product with build container 24 seconds )

S13: Build custom lighttpd ( build 1.23 minutes )

S14: Get customized lighttpd , check -V for module support ) , ls /etc/apk/keys/



# Takeaway

- Always source code, no exemption
- No binaries whatsoever
- Bridge the gap between
  - Foss culture ( Cool stuff )
  - Compliance culture ( Boring stuff )
- Business model for Bom Resolver
  - Alpine resolver ( Github / MIT License )
  - Bomresolver.io ( Apply the concept for Go, Python etc )
  - Bomresolver.com ( Compliance as a service )


Support slides

# Bom Resolver as tool

```
$ podman run --rm docker.io/bomres/base_os_alpine make > Makefile
$ make config
$ vim product/build/base_os/config/packages
$ vim product/build/base_os/config/settings
$ make build
$ make resolve
$ make download_source
```

[Bom Resolver](#)

# Renovate




```
"secfixes": {  
  "1.2.2_pre2-r0": [  
    "CVE-2020-28928"  
  ],  
  "1.1.23-r2": [  
    "CVE-2019-14697"  
  ],  
  "1.1.15-r4": [  
    "CVE-2016-8859"  
  ]  
}
```

[Mend Renovate: Automated Dependency Updates](#)



# Analyze patches



# From mockup to market

Short feedback loops  
Enables us to define the  
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defined, we **build it right**  
( In compliance with NIS2, DORA, etc )

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<b>Building everything manually</b>	Full flexibility Learning experience	Dependency hell Need to understand a lot of details Version compatibility Lack of reproducibility
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Example of aggregators are

- Redhat
- OpenSuse
- Debian
- **Alpine**

Aggregator fetch source code from Projects and creates components provided as

- Packages ( rpm , apk , deb )
- ISO images
- **Containers ( docker images )**

Aggregators support different architectures

- x86\_64
- Arm


Aggregators improves Foss

- Add functionality
- Fix **security** issues

# Aggregator model

Short feedback loops  
Enables us to define the  
**right product**

Binary distribution Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, etc.	Easy to create and extend
---	---------------------------



# Take Away from Bom Resolver

	Pros	Cons
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Mockup phase {

Product phase {

# Simple product


For better understanding of the software supply chain, keep the product small and study the tools required to compile the source code

```
#include <stdio.h>


int main(void)
{
    printf("Hello World\n");
}
```

# Build dependencies


Dynamically linked build




Static linked build



Bare metal build



# Cross compile



[Introduction \(crosstool-ng.github.io\)](https://crosstool-ng.github.io)